Veröffentlichung

Siebert, Johannes U.; von Winterfeldt, Detlof; John, Richard. “Identifying and Structuring the Objectives of the “Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (ISIL) and its Followers.”Decision Analysis (INFORMS), 13(1), 2016, 26-50,dx.doi.org/10.1287/deca.2015.0324

What does the Islamic State want? Dr. Johannes Siebert at the University of Bayreuth and U.S. researchers at the University of Southern California (USC) have systematically analyzed the IS’s objectives for the first time. The study was recently published in the renowned INFORMS journal Decision Analysis.

The decision-theoretical methodology on which the study is based was originally developed in economics and can in principle be applied to any institution, organization or group and also to individual persons. In particular, it works with scientifically proven methods of examining written texts and oral statements. The authors have analyzed a variety of sources in this way:

Interviews with 59 experts in the following fields: Islamist terror and jihadist movements; Middle East politics and international relations; history, anthropology, and sociology; and psychology of terrorism.

Publicly available sources of information on the Internet: Transcripts of 12 speeches by the most prominent IS leaders; expert interviews and articles related to IS published in U.S. or German media.

On this basis, Dr. Johannes Siebert, an economist at the University of Bayreuth, and Prof. Detlof von Winterfeldt and Prof. Richard John at USC elaborated and compared the objectives of the IS leadership and the objectives of IS supporters.

Objectives of IS-leadership

Die IS-Führung verfolgt strategische Ziele, die einerseits stärker religiös, andererseits stärker militärisch ausgerichtet sind. In militärischer Hinsicht will sie im Irak und an der Levante ein Kalifat errichten. Um diese Absicht zu verwirklichen, will sie die beste

The IS leadership is pursuing strategic objectives that are more religiously oriented on the one hand and more militarily oriented on the other. In military terms, it wants to establish a caliphate in Iraq and the Levant. To achieve this goal, it wants to eliminate the existing governments in Iraq and the Levant, keep its own territory under control and steadily expand it, and increase the number of fighters and followers. Another militarily accentuated objective is to control and govern this caliphate, which is to function as an Islamic State and provide services to its own citizens. The supply of military and civilian goods is to be secured, internal security maintained and at least the appearance of state order guaranteed.

Clearly religiously accentuated, on the other hand, is the strategic objective of members of the IS leadership to restore the strengths and glory of Sunni Islam. With this in mind, they want to implement a pure and strict version of Islam in their own territory, give meaning to the lives of Sunni believers, enforce sharia by the sword, and be recognized as leaders of Islam. This is followed on the strategic level by another religious objective: the worldwide spread of Islam and Sharia norms. To this end, the world is to be ‘cleansed’ of anti-Islamic forces and other countries attacked from within. Foreign powers are to be prevented from interfering politically and militarily in Iraq and the Levant.

The IS leadership considers two means in particular to be consistently suitable for achieving these objectives at the operational level: Killing, intimidating and/or converting infidels and generating financial resources.

In the area of tension between territorial warfare and the export of religion

“In the early days of IS, the focus was more on the military-oriented objectives related to the establishment and control of a caliphate. It was mainly Saddam Hussein’s former military leaders who focused on this,” explains Dr. Johannes Siebert. “Because IS was very much interested in its own statehood in the Middle East, there initially seemed to be a clear difference from Al-Qaeda. This is because the core objectives of this movement have always included attacking people and institutions abroad. The Paris attacks, however, suggest that IS’s religiously based objectives have recently gained more weight – both at the strategic level and among its followers. Many IS fighters from Arab countries are apparently willing to die abroad for the global spread of Islam and Sharia law.”

The authors of the study draw attention to the fact that the religious and military objectives pursued by IS leaders are not infrequently in tension with each other. The religiously motivated, violent struggle for the export of a ‘pure’ Islam to other regions of the world could lead to a growing willingness of the attacked states to fight the IS on its own territory. Occupying and defending this territory, in turn, ties up resources that IS, on the other hand, would need to plan and finance attacks abroad. 

Objectives of IS-followers

Within IS’s followers, the scholars distinguish three strategic objectives: humanitarian, religious, and personal fulfillment. Fighting for general humanitarian causes – and especially for those of the Sunnis – is a strategic dimension that should not be underestimated in the authors’ view. Many IS supporters act in the belief that their fighting efforts serve to (re)establish and spread living conditions characterized by social justice, tranquility, security and the absence of oppression. A strong motive is likewise the religious fulfillment that IS supporters believe they find by espousing a ‘pure’ and austere version of Islam and ‘fighting for God’. These religious and humanitarian objectives of the followers are largely consistent with the strategic objectives of the IS leadership.

The situation is different with regard to the personal fulfillment that many supporters expect from working for IS. Belonging to a ‘brotherhood of fighters’, attacking citizens of Western countries and Jews, acting out their own violence and brutality – with these intentions, IS supporters fit in well with the strategic objectives of the IS leadership. But equally, they seek personal satisfaction through gaining power, improving their material situation, and increasing self-esteem. “These intentions often go unsatisfied, so IS followers do not always find the personal fulfillment they seek. That is why some young men from Western countries who have joined IS as fighters return disappointed,” explains Dr. Johannes Siebert. “If they repeatedly report these experiences publicly, this could potentially dampen the illusions of other young people who are attracted to IS.”

Source: Universität Bayreuth, Pressemitteilung Nr. 221/2015 vom 25. November 2015

Veröffentlichung

Siebert, Johannes U.; Keeney, Ralph L. “Creating More and Better Alternatives for Decisions Using Objectives”, Operations Research, September/Oktober 2015, 63(5), 1144-1158, dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.2015.1411

„There is no alternative!“, so begründete die britische Premierministerin Margaret Thatcher Ende der 1970er Jahre ihr wirtschafts- und sozialpolitisches Reformprogramm. Alsbald wurde dieser Slogan in den Medien als „TINA“-Prinzip karikiert. Aber gibt es überhaupt Entscheidungen ohne Alternativen? Und was besagt ihre vermeintliche Alternativlosigkeit über ihre Qualität?  Aktuelle Studien, die aus einer engen Zusammenarbeit des Bayreuther Ökonomen Dr. Johannes Siebert und des U.S.-amerikanischen Entscheidungstheoretikers Prof. Dr. Ralph L. Keeney hervorgegangen sind, zeigen: Gerade dann, wenn Menschen kreativ und zielorientiert nach verschiedenen Handlungsoptionen Ausschau halten, steigt die Qualität ihrer Entscheidungen. In der renommierten Fachzeitschrift „Operations Research“ stellen die beiden Wissenschaftler ihre Ergebnisse vor.

Narrowed view of alternatives blinds us to the best options

People who have to make a decision are often unable to identify all the alternatives relevant to them. Without support, they often only identify less than half of the possible courses of action that they believe should be considered as soon as they are explicitly asked about them. This was the finding of an experiment involving around 200 bachelor’s and master’s students in business or business-related programs. In the run-up to deciding on an internship, they identified on their own only 37 percent of those possible courses of action that they later rated as relevant when presented with a comprehensive ‘master list’ of options.

The narrowed view of the wide field of possible alternatives also has considerable consequences for the quality of decisions. For as Keeney and Siebert were able to demonstrate in the same study, people in decision-making situations are often blind to options that they subsequently evaluate as particularly advantageous. Before students were presented with a ‘master list’ of possible alternatives, only 44 percent of them considered the option they subsequently rated best; and only 10 percent of them recognized their top three favorites in advance. But if particularly advantageous courses of action are not considered at all, they cannot be chosen; for it is clear that a decision is always a choice of an option that has been identified in advance.

Siebert explains this ‘blindness’ to a beneficial, even the best, decision with an example from the study: Halfway through his internship, a student has the desire to work full-time for the company after graduation. What should he do to achieve this objective? Most of the students surveyed mention options such as “work longer,” “try harder,” or “take on responsibility,” but by far the most promising option does not occur to them: namely, that the student should ask his boss what he needs to do in the second half of his internship to increase his chances of getting a full-time position. As long as the boss does not know about the intern’s interest, the other options mentioned prove to be less effective. However, most of the interviewees only realize this after the fact.

Translated with DeepL

“The better the alternatives considered before a decision is made, the better, as a rule, the option ultimately chosen,” explains the Bayreuth economist. “Many individuals and organizations focus on discussing and evaluating individual alternatives. However, it turns out to be much more effective to invest more effort in developing alternatives.”

Identifying objectives – a key to discovering beneficial opportunities for action.

But what can people do in the run-up to a decision so that they have a wider range of possible alternatives in front of them – especially those possible courses of action that are in their well-understood interests? It is of crucial importance to be aware of one’s own objectives. “Following up on previous scientific literature, Professor Ralph Keeney and I took an approach that is already obvious based on general life experience,” Siebert reports. “We investigated whether the recognition of advantageous courses of action is stimulated and expanded when people first account for what objectives they actually want to achieve before making decisions. Such a positive effect can indeed be demonstrated. The results of our studies are unanimous on this point.

Because in further tests with around 400 students, it turned out: If they had their own objectives clearly in mind, they were able to identify more and better possible courses of action in the run-up to a decision than if it was not clear to them which objectives should be taken into account in their decision. Students who were ‘goal conscious’ were able to discover twice as many possible courses of action with the help of creative considerations than students who had not previously thought about their own objectives. And what is even more significant: In 58 percent of these cases, the range of possible actions identified in a goal-conscious manner was subsequently rated higher.

In light of these findings, Siebert and Keeney tested different procedures to encourage creative searches for promising courses of action. A comprehensive ‘master list’ of objectives combined with guidance on how to use these objectives to conduct such a search proved particularly effective. In this way, the number of alternatives considered in the run-up to a decision was increased by 53 percent.

Time is no substitute for purposeful decision making

Could such an effect also be achieved by simply giving people more time to prepare a decision? Is the visualization of objectives possibly a time-consuming detour that could be avoided if more time were available for a less goal-oriented search for alternatives? This is clearly denied by the two scientists. Their research shows that a systematic visualization of objectives is indispensable if one wants to encourage people in difficult decision-making situations to consider many meaningful alternatives.

From scientific studies to practice: recommendations for action

At the end of their contribution to “Operations Research,” Siebert and Keeney, who conducts research at the renowned Duke University in the U.S., develop a series of recommendations on how the research results obtained can be used to optimize decision-making processes – whether in politics, in companies, social organizations or individual life planning. It benefits the quality of decisions, he said, when multiple people are involved in identifying and weighing objectives and meaningful alternatives for action: i.e., not only those responsible for ultimately making the decision, but also analysts and other stakeholders. “Loneliness and time pressure, combined with unclear objectives and a limited view of possible alternatives, are poor prerequisites for good decisions,” says Dr. Johannes Siebert, who intends to expand on the studies now published in further research.

Source: Universität Bayreuth, Pressemitteilung Nr. 168/2015 vom 11. September 2015